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CAN SOCIAL TRINITARIANISM BE MONOTHEIST?
A REPLY TO DALE TUGGY
William Hasker

Dale Tuggy has criticized my proposal for the doctrine of the Trinity, claiming that social trinitarianism cannot be monotheistic. I present a counterargument, and consider the ways in which Tuggy might respond to it.

According to Brian Leftow, a “hard task for ST [social trinitarianism] is
providing an account of what monotheism is which both is intuitively acceptable and lets ST count as monotheist.”1 Dale Tuggy agrees, and he is
convinced that the task cannot be accomplished.2 Tuggy’s criticisms of my
view of the Trinity are numerous and complex, and a full response would
require more space than is available here. (For additional detail, readers
are referred to my book, Metaphysics and the Tri-Personal God.3) It is possible, however, to give a brief response to the central challenge concerning
monotheism.
The fundamental premise in Tuggy’s critique is that a god, or a God, is
and must be a single divine person, a single “center of knowledge, will,
love, and action.”4 If there is more than one divine person, there is more
than one God—hence, polytheism. The social trinitarian conception of
God as a Trinity of closely related persons cannot, then, qualify as monotheistic. If this premise is granted, all the rest of the criticisms become
unnecessary. Now, I have never been able to understand why unitarians
like Tuggy should be entitled to fix the definition of monotheism, so as to
rule out trinitarians as being monotheists. (At least, those trinitarians who
recognize Father, Son, and Holy Spirit as distinct persons—and as Tuggy
1
Brian Leftow, “Anti Social Trinitarianism,” in Philosophical and Theological Essays on the
Trinity, ed. Thomas McCall and Michael C. Rea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009),
52–88; the quoted passage is on 55.
2
See Dale Tuggy, “Hasker’s Quests for a Viable Social Theory,” Faith and Philosophy 30:2
(2013).
3
William Hasker, Metaphysics and the Tri-Personal God (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2013).
4
I borrow this phrasing from Cornelius Plantinga; also following Plantinga, I understand
social trinitarianism to be the view that the Persons of the Trinity are distinct persons in this
sense. See Cornelius Plantinga, Jr., “Social Trinity and Tritheism,” in Trinity, Incarnation, and
Atonement: Philosophical and Theological Essays, ed. Ronald J. Feenstra and Cornelius Plantinga, Jr. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989), 22.
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admits, there have been many such trinitarians.5) Historically, Judaism,
Christianity, and Islam have been recognized as the three great monotheistic religions, and Christianity has been trinitarian at least since the third
century—and before that binitarian almost from the very beginning. In
any case, there is a concise argument which I, at least, find convincing,
to the effect that social trinitarianism should indeed be recognized as a
version of monotheism. Here is the argument:
1. The beliefs and worship practices of the early Christian communities, as depicted in the writings of the New Testament, constitute a
valid and acceptable form of monotheism.
2. The early Christians perceived God the Father and Jesus Christ as
distinct persons—as “distinct centers of knowledge, will, love, and
action.”
3. The early Christians exhibit a pattern of “binitarian” belief and worship, in which Jesus is honored, praised, and worshiped along with
God the Father.
4. No non-divine person can properly be the recipient of divine worship. Therefore,
5. There is a valid and acceptable version of monotheism in which
there is more than one divine person.
If this argument is accepted, we have a definitive answer to Leftow’s challenge to provide “an account of what monotheism is which both is intuitively acceptable and lets ST count as monotheist.” The argument does
not, to be sure, provide an analytic definition of monotheism in terms of
necessary and sufficient conditions; this is often difficult when we are
dealing with broad-ranging and complex historical phenomena such
as monotheism. (Compare “revolution.”) Rather, it points to a concrete
historical exemplar, a “paradigm case” against which other claims concerning the phenomenon can be measured.
I don’t expect the argument to be convincing to Tuggy; I am less certain
about Leftow. Leftow, I think, would be willing to accept (1), and (2) is a
simple matter of reading the New Testament; objections at that point are
most unpromising. Nor will he, as a trinitarian, deny premise (4); this,
after all, was what the Arian controversy was about. So if Leftow is going
5
Consider the following from Gregory of Nyssa, one of the leaders among the fourthcentury “pro-Nicene” fathers:
The Jewish dogma is destroyed by the acceptance of the Word, and the belief in the
Spirit; while the polytheistic error of the Greek school is made to vanish by the unity
of the Nature abrogating this imagination of plurality. While yet again, of the Jewish
conception, let the unity of the Nature stand; and of the Hellenistic, only the distinction as to persons; the remedy against a profane view being thus applied, as required,
on either side. (The Great Catechism, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Vol. 6, 477)
Gregory approves here of the Greek doctrine of “the distinction as to persons”; assuredly, the
many gods of the Greeks were quite distinct personalities.
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to reject the argument, his point of attack will have to be premise (3)—and
that premise, in any case, calls for a bit of discussion. The premise alludes
to New Testament scholarship which finds in the texts the phenomenon of
“Christological monotheism”—a practice of Christian belief and worship
in which Jesus is placed alongside the God of Israel as a focus of worship and devotion.6 My brief discussion of this topic here draws on the
massive, and highly respected, work by Larry Hurtado, Lord Jesus Christ:
Devotion to Jesus in Earliest Christianity.7 Hurtado shows, through the examination of New Testament texts in their historical context, that what we
have in the life of the early Church is a pattern of devotion to Jesus such
that “when this constellation of devotional actions is set in the general
first-century religious context, it is properly understood as constituting
the cultic worship of Jesus.”8 What we have here, in fact, is a pattern of
“binitarian worship”—worship of Jesus along with the Father—and one
that originated surprisingly early in the newborn Christian movement.
This pattern is evident in the earliest Christian writings we have, the letters
of Paul, and is most plausibly seen as having originated in the very earliest
days of the Christian movement. It is noteworthy, furthermore, that Paul,
no shrinking violet when it came to controversy, felt no need to justify or defend his exalted view of Jesus—as seen, for instance, in Philippians 2:5–11.
Rather, he presents this understanding of Jesus as something his readers
will already be familiar with and will readily accept, something which he
therefore can use as a basis for his appeal to them for Christlike attitudes
and conduct.
A striking portrayal of such binitarian worship can be found in the
slightly later book of Revelation. In 5:11–13 we find the heavenly host
worshiping the Lamb along with God: “Worthy is the Lamb that was slaughtered to receive power and wealth and wisdom and might and honor and
glory and blessing! . . . To the one seated on the throne and to the Lamb be
blessing and honor and glory and might forever and ever!” (Note by way
of contrast that the exalted angels who are instructing the seer specifically
forbid his offering worship to them (19:10; 22:8–9).) Without doubt, this
description of the heavenly worship provided a template for the worship
that was to be offered, and that was in fact offered, in the churches for
whom the book was written. The limitations of the present paper prevent
me from deploying the evidence at all fully; readers are strongly encouraged to consult Hurtado’s very readable work for the overall picture.
We have, then, the spectacle of the early Christians offering cultic worship
to Jesus along with the Father, something which Jews had never done to any
of the “divine agents” (angels, exalted patriarchs, and so on) that play a
6
A selection of essays on this topic may be found in The Jewish Roots of Christological Monotheism: Papers from the St. Andrews Conference on the Historical Origins of the Worship of Jesus, ed.
Carey C. Newman, James R. Davila, and Gladys S. Lewis (Leiden: Brill, 1999).
7
Larry Hurtado, Lord Jesus Christ: Devotion to Jesus in Earliest Christianity (Grand Rapids,
MI: Eerdmans, 2003).
8
Ibid., 138.
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role in some of their traditions. Given this, along with the other premises,
the conclusion of the argument stated above seems to be fully justified: we
have monotheistic worship in which Jesus is honored and glorified along
with, and in the same way as, God the Father.
How might opponents of social trinitarianism respond to this argument? I doubt that Leftow will want to deny the first premise; to do so
would align his views with those of the Jewish authorities who, sometime
during the first century, expelled Jewish Christians from the synagogue
because of their excessive exaltation of Jesus. As a trinitarian, he will not
wish to deny premise (4). If he wishes nevertheless to reject the conclusion,
he will have to contest the historical case for premise (3) made by Hurtado
and his fellow scholars. I must confess that I am doubtful of the success
of such a venture, but anyone is welcome to make the attempt. For Tuggy,
on the other hand, the situation is more complex. To be sure, he also could
contest the historical evidence for premise (3). (In fact, however, he does
not disagree with this premise.) Another option, favored by theological
liberals, is to deny (at least implicitly) premise (1). Jesus, it is sometimes
said, was by no means the cosmic redeemer featured in some of the later
New Testament texts; rather, he was a simple teacher, Cynic sage, or . . .
[insert here your own preferred characterization], who would have been
shocked at the extravagant claims made about him by later Christians. His
more authentic followers were those who gathered around his teachings
and honored him without the excesses of later speculation. Proposals such
as this are interesting, to be sure, though they are handicapped by the serious lack of historical evidence that anything of the sort actually occurred.
But these speculations, if accepted, do free contemporary Christians from
the need to acknowledge the high christology of the New Testament as
authentically monotheistic.
Having said this, I do not believe Tuggy wishes to avail himself of this
option. Tuggy is not a liberal; his views are best described as “biblical
unitarianism.”9 He accepts the writings of Scripture as genuinely the word
of God, and seeks to understand and affirm their teachings. There is, however, another strategy for avoiding the argument given above which he
does adopt. That way is to accept the truth of premises (1)–(3) but to deny
premise (4). That is to say: he can admit that Jesus was worshiped along
with God, as the texts clearly imply, and yet deny that this means that Jesus
is a divine person, in the sense affirmed by trinitarians. Here we may think
of the Arians and other subordinationists in the ancient Church. They did
worship Jesus, and regarded him as in some sense divine, but not in the
same sense that the Father was divine. (The Son/Logos was God, but not
“true God,” a fact which accounts for the presence of the latter expression
in the Nicene Creed.) So the Logos was worshiped, but was not (fully) a
divine person.
9
See www.biblicalunitarian.com (Tuggy, however, has no formal affiliation with the
group that sponsors this website).
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Tuggy, however, is no Arian. Nor does he think that there are semidivine beings (God’s “near-peers”) somehow bridging the gap between
God and the created world. Like most modern unitarians,10 he holds that
Jesus is, ontologically, a human being and nothing more—though to be
sure, a very special human being, one that was uniquely blessed by God
and used by God—and one that, in view of this, is a proper recipient of
worship. Tuggy thus denies the claim made by premise (4), which is axiomatic to Nicene trinitarians and to many others, that only God should
be worshiped.11 And this brings me to my final conundrum concerning
Tuggy’s position, something which I am simply at a loss to understand. He
believes that this view of Jesus, as ontologically human and nothing more,
is the view that is found in the writings of the New Testament, rightly interpreted; such a view is fully compatible with the praises of Jesus and the
worship of Jesus that are there recorded. This is what is being said about
Jesus in John 1:1–18, and Philippians 2:5–11, and Hebrews 1:1–14, and in
many other passages. But how he is able to convince himself of this, I am
unable to comprehend.12
Huntington University

10
The qualification is needed because Tuggy classifies as “unitarians” all the ancient
writers who thought the Son/Logos was ontologically subordinate to the Father / God, from
Tertullian and Origen to the Arians and anti-Nicenes of the fourth century. I think this is
a gerrymandered classification that fails to mark the significant divisions in the history of
doctrine, but I will not argue that point here.
11
For a discussion of this, see Tuggy’s article, “Who Should Christians Worship?” in
Journal from the Radical Reformation, 2013.
12
My thanks to Dale Tuggy for his comments on an earlier version of this reply. Thanks
also to Joseph Jedwab and another (unnamed) referee, and to the editor of Faith and Philosophy, for their comments.

